



Rule of Law, Justice and Security in Guinea-Bissau

Operational Expenses of Five (5) Access to Justice Centers in Guinea-Bissau (2012–2015)

A pilot project of the Rule of Law and Security (ROLS) Programme led by the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, financed and supported by UNDP through its ROLS Programme

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ATLAS – UNDP Corporate Financial Sysytem

A2J – Access to Justice

BCPR – Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery

BPPS – Bureau for Policy and Program Support

CAJ – Access to Justice Centers (Centros de Acesso à Justiça)

CO – Country Office

GICJU – Gabinete de Informação e Consulta Jurídica

INE – Insituto Nacional de Estatistica

INL – International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs

JSSR – Justice and Security Sector Reform

LGDH – Liga Guinnense dos Direitos Humanos

OAGB – Ordem dos Advogados da Guine-Bissau

PAS – Postos de Atendimento Sectoriais

PBF – Peace Building Fund

PJ – Policia Judiciaria

POP – Policia de Ordem Publica

ROLS – Rule of Law and Security (ROLS)

UNDP – United Nations Development Programme

UNV – United Nations Volunteer

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1. Introduction

The Access to Justice Centers (A2J), known otherwise in their Portuguese acronym as Centros de Acesso a Justica (CAJs), in Guinea-Bissau, have continued to promote alternative mechanisms to bring justice services closer to the population through the provision of free legal aid services and conflict mediation, thereby contributing for the fulfilment of human rights and rule of law, especially in the rural setting. CAJs are part of the overall Rule of Law and Security (ROLS) programme led by the Ministry of Justice with the purpose of providing legal assistance, counseling and legal information to the most vulnerable. CAJs assisted a total of **7,028 cases** between 2012 and 2015. The cases involved property and land disputes, incidences of domestic violence, forced marriages and robbery. The aim of this report is to present the results of a study envisioned to carry out a comprehensive analysis to assess the overall financial situation for the operations of five Access to Justice Centers in Guinea-Bissau from 2012 to 2015. The study conducted data analysis of operational expenses incurred by all CAJs since their inception. The terms operational expense, running expense, running cost and operational cost will be used interchangeably in this report to refer to the administrative costs pertaining to rent, salaries, fuel consumption, office supplies, internet, and maintenance that supported the CAJ activities between 2012 and 2015. The results of the study showed that the existing five CAJs cost over **one and a half million dollars** from 2012 to 2015. This information is crucial to UNDP, but more importantly to the Ministry of Justice since the Ministry is now interested in assuming full responsibility for the management of all CAJs in the near future.

1.1 Programme Background

UNDP has been undertaking interventions aiming at strengthening the Justice and Security Sector Reform (JSSR) process in Guinea Bissau. These interventions are designed to strengthen the capacity of the justice sector, access to justice, and capacity of the security sector for consolidation of democracy in Guinea Bissau. They are also fully in line with the National Strategy for Modernization and Restructuring of the Security Sector that was approved by the country's National Assembly in 2006.

ROLS is a UNDP programme led by the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau. The programme received a total budget of **8.2 million USD** from its various donors, and spent **7.7 million USD** or **94%** between 2008 and 2015. ROLS was initially signed in 2008 with the duration of two years until 2010. Since it was signed in early 2008, the dynamics of international support to the sector have been evolving at a rapid pace, with several international partners working in the sector as well as national partners, especially its major partner the Ministry of Justice. In early 2010, the United Nations Integrated Mission started its mandate mostly with a political role over Security Sector Reform (SSR). To address the concerns, priorities and emerging issues in the justice and security sector, it was necessary to redirect, redesign and seek additional resources to support the Government of Guinea Bissau to continue its endeavors in the process of establishing independent, viable and transparent justice system for its people and professionalized security forces for the country. In light of the plans and support programs from a myriad of partners, this assistance also needed to be revised to ensure non duplication of efforts and improved synergies among international partners.

For this reason, in early 2010, the Bureau for Policy and Programme Support (BPPS), formerly known as Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery (BCPR), supported a Revision Mission to extensively revise the Rule of Law and Security Programme; BPPS has been the major donor of ROLS programme. Following those recommendations and after a comprehensive consultative process, this programme was revised, with significant changes in scope, structure, and size, including a stronger focus on the “demand side of justice.” After two missions on the field to assess results of the first phase and redirect the project, a new project document (second phase) was approved in September 2010 with the duration of two years (2010-2012), but extended until 2013. The revised ROLS of the second phase adopted a people-centered approach that emphasized access to justice in three pilot regions, long-term capacity development and institutionalized training for the judiciary, planning and increased accountability of the sector. It focused on the formal justice sector mainly through supporting infrastructures and capacity development, but also on the customary and traditional mechanisms, with an emphasis on legal information and access to justice services. Improved governance of the justice and security sector remains as a priority. The policing scope is now limited to the role of the police in the overall functioning of the judicial chain in identified pilot regions.

In 2014, a new project document of ROLS' third phase was approved for two years 2014-2015, but extended until December 2016. The third phase has provided financial and technical assistance to improve Access to Justice in the country. It has also contributed not only to provide free legal aid services for the population but also promote a culture of professionalism and ethic within public service providers, particularly within the judiciary and law enforcement agencies. In regard to long-term capacity development and institutionalized training for the Judiciary, the project aims at strengthening the capacity of the Judiciary in a systematic and structured manner through in-country training tailored for magistrates and judiciary personnel. It has been the first opportunity to promote strategies of interface between formal and informal justice in a country that is characterized by the predominance of the latter system. In this sense, the project has promoted strategies to advocate for legislative revisions where adequate harmonizing state law with customary law in respect of human rights, training of the sector (community) courts judges on customary law as well as of traditional authorities on fundamental and human rights, amongst others.

In summary, ROLS prioritizes three key areas: **i)** Decentralization of the justice system and improvement of the access to justice for the poor with special emphasis on women; **ii)** Judicial training and mentoring; **iii)** Strategic planning, coordination and oversight of the justice and security systems. The programme provides for a strengthened Program Management Unit, with international and national expertise on program management, training/mentoring, access to justice and communications/Monitoring and Evaluation. The programme has also established project units known as Access to Justice Centers or CAJs in the capital city of Bissau and at the regional level in three regions, namely Cacheu, Oio and Bafata.

1.2 Poor Access to Justice in Guinea-Bissau: There are few Lawyers per capita in the country

In order to comprehend the operations of CAJs in Guinea-Bissau, one needs to have a basic background of how they came into existence. The issue of providing access to justice services in Guinea-Bissau is complicated not only by the availability of lawyers, but the actual number of

lawyers capable of serving the general population. Not only is the number of lawyers at present insufficient to provide access to justice services in the country, but the overwhelming majority of lawyers are concentrated in the capital city of Bissau, while over 60%² of the population reside in rural areas. With the total population of 1,530,673³ people in 2015, Guinea-Bissau has only 136 lawyers, according to the latest figures of *Ordem de Advogados da Guiné-Bissau (OAGB)*.⁴ This yields a ratio of 11,255 people for every one lawyer. This is a high ratio as compared to other countries where ratios of people in relation to one lawyer are much lower. In his article, *Access to Justice in South Africa: Are There Enough Lawyers?*, David McQuoid-Mason shows that some African countries, but especially European countries are exceptional examples. In Ghana, the ratio is 7,826 people to one lawyer, in Nigeria 2,857 to one, and in South Africa 2,273 to one. For much lower ratios, Germany has 593 people to one lawyer, Italy 488 to one, Spain 395 to one, Brazil 326 to one, and United States 265 to one (pp.565,576). The lack of lawyers in Guinea-Bissau to meet the demands of the overwhelming majority of the population suggests that other mechanisms be put in place to serve as alternatives to lawyers.

1.3 UNDP Response

In the fall of 2009, the Government of Guinea-Bissau requested support from UNDP for the development of legal aid mechanisms and services to expand the justice services throughout the country. Following this request, UNDP through its ROLS Programme first supported the Ministry of Justice in organizing a forum of the justice sector in 2010. It was the first time in the history of Guinea-Bissau that such an event took place in the justice sector involving all stakeholders to debate justice issues. The forum culminated in the development of the strategic document of the Ministry of Justice known as *National Policy for the Justice Sector (2010-2015)*. The results of the forum debates were incorporated into this strategic document to guide the justice sector in Guinea-Bissau for five years. The policy was approved by the Council of Ministers in January of 2011. According to the document, National Policy for the Justice Sector 2010-2015, the policy consisted of four main pillars that defined the goals of the justice sector: infrastructure, legislative

² Instituto Nacional de Estatística (INE). *Guiné-Bissau : Recenseamento Geral da População e Habitação, Tema Mortalidade III RGPH/2009* (p.20). The same source also indicates that the rural population was over 77% in 1997.

³ Ibid, Population 2015

⁴ OAGB is the Bar Association of Guinea-Bissau where lawyers are officially registered.

reform, professional training and access to justice and citizenship. The infrastructure component was designed to improve the degrading conditions of the justice facilities such as courts, training centers, and prisons nationwide through construction and rehabilitation services. The legislative component intended to carry out reform of the justice laws and procedures, while the professional training looked at the training aspect of judges, prosecutors, lawyers and other justice operators. Finally, the idea of the access to justice was to bring the population closer to the justice system by providing them with basic information on how the justice system works in Guinea-Bissau, and how they can have access to justice services (p.12). This was one of the main achievements of the ROLS programme.

1.4 Creation of Access to Justice Centers in Guinea-Bissau

In September of 2011, the Office for Legal Information and Consultation (GICJU) and four Access to Justice Centers were created and inaugurated by the Government of Guinea-Bissau with the support of UNDP. GICJU is a coordinating unit for all CAJs under the tutelage of the Ministry of Justice. Two centers (CAJs Bairro Militar and Bissau Velho) are based in the capital city of Bissau, while the other two (CAJs Canchungo and Mansoa) are based in the northern regions of Cacheu and Oio with their respective staff and legal assistants. The fifth CAJ Bafata was created in the spring of 2013. The creation of GICJU and CAJs was foreseen in the *National Policy for the Justice Sector* (p.41).

2. Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this analytical study is twofold. First, the results of this study will serve as the baseline to aid the Ministry of Justice to better manage the activities of CAJs in the future. Since UNDP Rule of Law Programme has closely monitored the administrative and financial aspects of all CAJs, it is important that this information be shared with the Ministry to facilitate a sustainable process and handover. Second, the idea is to prepare in-house reference information to serve as future development indicators for decision-making and management. This information will also be relevant and useful to highlight for resource mobilization for the CAJ and legal aid generally.

International donors are not interested in financing programmes that spend more money on staff cost and other administrative related expenses. They are more willing and likely to provide funding to development programmes whose goals and objectives contribute to direct impact and change on the lives of the people, particularly in the developing world. For instance, a good financial proposal requesting and targeting for more than seventy percent of the funds to cover programme activities is likely to be considered by donors' funding priorities. The result of this study can therefore serve as a tool to facilitate the resource mobilization process, particularly in answering some key questions relating to the actual costs required to set up a CAJ from scratch.

This analytical study also included the running costs of other entities such as *Liga Guineense dos Direitos Humanos* (LGDH-Human Rights League) and OAGB⁵ that worked within CAJs for a period of time to provide support of legal aid services. The Human Rights League's activists were trained in legal aid related issues and financed by UNDP to support the CAJ activities in 2012 and 2013. They were responsible for the community interventions, and acted as the intermediates between the communities and the CAJs. They reported any human rights violation incidents that occurred within the communities to CAJs, and provided the victims with guidance to CAJs for further assistance. In addition, they worked closely with traditional authorities in the communities to provide awareness raising campaigns and training on prevention of human rights violations. Finally, this report will recount the major achievements that CAJs accomplished between 2012 and 2015.

3. Study Methodology

The approach used in this study was both quantitative and qualitative with a major emphasis on quantitative aspect. The study was done through data collection and few interviews with key people who were either directly or indirectly involved in the implementation of CAJ activities. All the parties involved in the study collaborated and gave a significant contribution to facilitate the process. This included CAJ staff of the Ministry of Justice and UNDP staff who willingly answered interview questions and provided feedback during the restitution workshop when the results of the

⁵ UNDP partnership with OAGB was not successful due to difficulty of ensuring legal representation in the regions. Most, if not all, lawyers are concentrated in Bissau, and make sporadic visits to the regions, thereby making it impossible to render legal representation outside of Bissau.

study were concluded. Therefore, this study enabled everyone to exchange and share ideas on their experience during the implementation process.

3.1 Pre-study Scenario

Following the establishment of the five Access to Justice Centers (CAJs), the main concern of Senior Management was to know how much it cost to create one CAJ. However, it was too early to answer this question since CAJ project had just been established for the first time in the history of Guinea-Bissau. Though this question could not be answered at the time, it provided ingredients and opportunities for further investigation. In this sense, the Programme Associate of UNDP Rule of Law Programme took the initiative to formulate mechanisms of control to monitor the operational expenses on a monthly and yearly basis. He designed and distributed various excel control sheets to all CAJ Administrative Assistants to collect data of monthly expenses pertaining to operational expenses. In addition, a training followed by a refresher training was held at UNDP office to familiarize the administrative assistants with data collection techniques in 2012. The administrative assistants were responsible for reporting this information to UNDP Rule of Law office at the end of every month from 2012 to 2015. This study selected eight (8) categories for analysis which are listed below as follows:


- 1) Salaries;**
- 2) Rent;**
- 3) Internet service;**
- 4) Fuel (Diesel and gasoline);**
- 5) Maintenance (Vehicle, generator, motorcycles, IT equipment);**
- 6) Office supplies;**
- 7) Construction and rehabilitation services;**
- 8) Equipment and furniture.**

Using the excel 2013 version, the information of the above categories was carefully consolidated in December 2015 for analysis purposes. Although the components of construction and rehabilitation services as well as equipment and furniture had not been part of the original analysis, they were later added not only to generate a complete picture of the overall expenditures, but also

to have a general idea of how much it requires to create one CAJ. The raw data of running expenses for five individual CAJs was populated in a single excel spreadsheet covering a period of four years (2012-2015). In addition, the monthly exchange rate figures of the UN system were recorded per month for all four years with the purpose of converting the actual expenditure figures in local currency Francs CFA into the US dollars. The powerful pivot table features of excel program facilitated in the calculation of total expenditures and their respective percentages, average exchange rate figures, ratios, and production of graphs and reports for monthly detailed information, quarterly information and annual summary for all CAJs.


4. Study Findings

The first result was the monthly report showing all details of expenses in local currency (Francs CFA) for each category, CAJ and year. The local currency figures were converted into US dollars using the UN monthly rates of exchange for periods between 2012 and 2015. The overall results of eight categories of running expenses are summarized in the following graph to show the total expenditures for five individual CAJs.



The addition of running expenses of all CAJs in the above graph generates the total expenditure of **1,734,661.01 USD**.⁶ This total amount was the result of a consolidation of monthly and annual expenses over the period of four years (2012-2015). For instance, the total expenses of 453,877.85 USD for CAJ Canchungo was generated by adding its annual total expenses of 166,519.44 USD for 2012, 117,353.85 USD for 2013, 101,046.36 USD for 2014, and 68,958.19 USD for 2015. The same was applied to obtain the totals for the remaining CAJs as displayed in the above column chart⁷.

CAJ Canchungo is unmistakably the leading entity in terms of running expenses in the total amount of 453,877.85 USD followed by CAJ Mansoa with the total expenses of 418,519.37 USD and CAJ Bissau Velho which falls below the range of four hundred thousand dollars. CAJ Bafata and CAJ Bairro Militar in particular show the lowest running expense figures below the range of three hundred thousand dollars. The pie chart below provides a better visual representation of percentages of running expenses for all CAJs during the four-year period.



⁶ Data crosscheck was done and the study results, including the total expenditures matched perfectly with other sources such as ATLAS financial reports.

⁷ See the table of “CAJ Running Costs Summary by Category 2012-2015” in Annex I for details of expenditures by CAJs, year and categories.

The first three CAJs with the highest running expenses are CAJ Canchungo with 26%, CAJ Mansoa 24%, and CAJ Bissau Velho 19%, while the lowest are CAJ Bafata 17% and CAJ Bairro Militar 14%. CAJ Bafata was only created in May 2013, and began its operational expenditures in the second half of 2013. However, the critical concern regarding these figures is that the disparity of expenditures among five CAJs raises analytical questions on why some CAJs spend more than others.

4.1 Why did some CAJs Spend More than Others?


Geographic Factor

While there are various factors behind cost discrepancies, the first possible answer is the geographical area that distinguishes the activities among five CAJs. The cost of creating one CAJ in the remote regions is higher than that of the capital city of Bissau. CAJs in the regions require more staff, equipment and furniture than CAJs in the capital city of Bissau. In addition, the overwhelming majority of reported cases in the last four years was registered in the regions due to the presence of *Postos de Atendimento Sectoriais PAS*⁸ (District Posts). For instance, regional CAJs assisted a total of 4,358 cases: 1,850 of CAJ Canchungo, 1,349 of CAJ Mansoa and 1,159 of CAJ Bafata. Urban CAJs covered only 2,670 cases: 1,529 of CAJ Bissau Velho and 1,141 of CAJ Bairro Militar. The district posts are fully functioning and providing assistance to the population in the regions while none is presently installed in the urban CAJs. CAJ Canchungo, CAJ Mansoa and CAJ Bafata are located in the northern and eastern regions, while CAJ Bissau Velho and CAJ Bairro Militar are based in Bissau.

In addition to the number of staff recruited by the Ministry of Justice to run CAJ activities in the regions, UNDP recruited three Legal Aid Experts, three national United Nations Volunteers (UNVs), and three drivers to support the CAJ activities in CAJ Canchungo, CAJ Mansoa and CAJ Bafata. The staff of all five CAJs have been under UNDP payroll since CAJs were established. As

⁸ See section “5. Main Achievements 2012-2015” for additional information on PAS and their impact on the number of assisted cases.

shown in the below graph, salaries made up **60%** or **1,041,661.28 USD** of the total running expenses of 1.7 million dollars during four years of CAJ operations.



After salaries, equipment and furniture category represented **12%** or **213,307.71 USD** of the total operational expenses. The majority of purchase of equipment and furniture was made to equip the CAJs of the regions. Unlike CAJ Bissau Velho and CAJ Bairro Militar, two vehicles were purchased to support the activities of CAJ Canchungo and CAJ Mansoa in 2012. Likewise, additional vehicle was purchased in 2013 for CAJ Bafata. The total amount spent on equipment and furniture was 56,966.98 USD for CAJ Bafata, 56,572.22 USD for CAJ Canchungo, 54,081.73 USD for CAJ Mansoa, compared to 27,856.16 USD for CAJ Bissau Velho and 17,830.62 USD for CAJ Bairro Militar. Therefore, the cost of equipment and furniture was higher for regional CAJs than Bissau CAJs.

Fuel Factor

The consumption of fuel by vehicles, generators and motorcycles was also another contributing factor for different operational expenditures among five CAJs. According to the findings of this study, CAJs from the regions consumed more fuel than CAJs from Bissau. This was primarily due


to constant visits that CAJ vehicles made on a regular basis to the communities to carry out legal aid activities. The technical advisers traveled regularly to remote communities and villages to provide training, workshop and awareness raising campaigns among others on justice issues. The total amount spent on fuel during four years was 25,325.30 USD for CAJ Canchungo, 23,576.19 USD for CAJ Mansoa, 14,131.44 USD for CAJ Bissau Velho, 12,813.28 USD for CAJ Bairro Militar and 11,376.18 USD for CAJ Bafata. The cost of fuel was higher for CAJ Canchungo and CAJ Mansoa as compared to Bissau's CAJs of Bissau Velho and Bairro Militar. As mentioned earlier, CAJ Bafata officially started its activities in 2013, otherwise its level of expenses would have been somewhere in the same range of its counterparts of Canchungo and Mansoa.

4.2 “How Much Does It Cost to Create One CAJ from Scratch and Sustain Its Expenses for One Year?”

A key question raised by one of the Rule of Law Advisers from New York during the evaluation mission in 2012 was the following: “How much does it cost to create one CAJ from scratch and sustain its expenses for one year?” This is one of the most probable questions a donor would ask before making a decision whether or not to finance a CAJ.

General Explanation

The findings of this study can answer this question based on the experience that the Ministry of Justice has amassed in managing CAJs in the last four years. The establishment of five CAJs in 2012 and 2013 by the Ministry of Justice with the support of UNDP Rule of Law Programme has provided sufficient information about the cost of CAJ operations. The evidence from past experience of 2012 and 2013 indicates that CAJs are too costly to create from scratch. Four CAJs were created and fully operated in 2012, and one CAJ was created and fully operated in 2013. Once CAJs are operationally established in the first years, however, the cost to operate them in the subsequent years tends to drop. Even more striking is the fall in the cost of CAJ operations in 2014 and 2015 as exemplified in the below graph.



The first noticeable thing in the above column chart is that the level of operational costs of CAJs by year was stronger in the first two years. Both UNDP and the Ministry of Justice were active in the preparation to open new CAJs for the first time. A tremendous amount of funds was outlaid to launch the recruitment process to hire new staff, purchase equipment and furniture, and carry out construction or rehabilitation of the premises for CAJ offices as was the case for CAJ Bissau Velho, CAJ Bairro Militar, CAJ Bafata and CAJ Mansoa. The buildings of these four CAJs had been found in precarious conditions; renovation was therefore necessary to create adequate conditions for the functioning of CAJs. The office of CAJ Canchungo was not rehabilitated. The total expenditure for 2012 was 556,111.98 USD, 512,257.23 USD for 2013, 389,433.18 USD for 2014 and 276,858.62 USD for 2015. Percentagewise, these figures represent 32% for 2012, 30% for 2013, 22% for 2014 and 16% for 2015, respectively. The decreasing expenditure from 2012 to 2015 is shown in the downward-sloping curve in the above graph where expenditures peaked in 2012, but fell sharply in 2013, 2014 and 2015.

Specific Answer

To answer the relevant question raised by the Rule of Law Adviser from New York, therefore, we need to analyze the level of expenditures of individual CAJs in more detail. For the regional CAJs, the total amount spent to create and run CAJ Canchungo in 2012 was 166,519.44 USD and

171,729.48 USD for CAJ Mansoa, whereas CAJ Bafata was 148,741.95 USD in 2013. Based on these figures, this tells us that the average cost to create one CAJ in the regions is **162,330.29 USD**. This estimate appears to be accurate as the total actual expenditures of individual CAJs in the region are closer to each other, particularly for CAJ Canchungo and CAJ Mansoa. The difference of expenditures between CAJ Canchungo and CAJ Mansoa is only 5,210.04 USD. Even the total expenditures of CAJ Bafata are high enough to support the accuracy of the average cost for three regional CAJs given that CAJ Bafata was created in the middle of 2013. While other regional CAJs operated fully in 2013, CAJ Bafata operated only six months in 2013. For urban CAJs, on the other hand, the total amount for the creation of CAJ Bissau Velho in 2012 was 130,917.05 USD and 86,946.01 USD for CAJ Bairro Militar. Therefore, the average cost to create one CAJ in the capital city is **108,931.53 USD**. The problem in calculating the averages is that some numbers fail to support the accuracy of the averages as they are too high in relation to others. There is a wide gap in the total amount of 43,971.04 USD between the total expenditures of CAJ Bissau Velho and CAJ Bairro Militar. That is, the average cost to create one CAJ in the city would have been more precise had the total expenditures of CAJ Bairro Militar been closer to those of CAJ Bissau Velho. It is now evident that it costs a lot more to create one CAJ in the regions than in the city. Likewise, it is more expensive to create one CAJ in the first year than to sustain it in the future years.

4.3 Why Did the Total Expenditures Fall Drastically in 2014 and 2015?

The resources needed to establish CAJs from the beginning were no longer required. No purchase was made for equipment and furniture, and no construction or rehabilitation work was carried out in 2014 and 2015. The only general expenses required to support the normal operation of CAJs were salaries, rent, internet, fuel, maintenance of equipment and office supplies. Equipment and furniture was the second most expensive component after salaries. While the total cost of equipment and furniture was 213,307.71 USD, the cost for construction and rehabilitation was 89,650.85 USD. The sum of the two figures combined is equal to 302,958.56 USD. Therefore, the omission of expenses for the two components contributed significantly in reducing the cost of operations in 2014 and 2015.

4.3.1 Termination of Contracts of Human Rights League and CAJ Regional Staff


The end of the activities of Human Rights League in CAJs in 2014 and reduction of staff in regional CAJs in 2015 also contributed in reducing the cost of operational expenses in these two years. The Human Rights League terminated its activities in CAJs when its contract with UNDP ended in 2014. On the other hand, the contracts of three Legal Aid Experts in CAJ Canchungo, CAJ Mansoa and CAJ Bafata ended in June 2015. This reduced the salary cost for three CAJs in the total amount of 39,100.11 USD from July to December 2015. In December 2015, the UNDP contracts with three drivers and three UNVs of regional CAJs also ended. The initiative of the Ministry of Justice to assume responsibility for the management of CAJs in the future was the reason for the termination of UNDP contracts with these staff. The idea was to unify all CAJ staff as per the recruitment procedure of the Ministry. The Ministry agreed to celebrate new contracts with the former UNDP service contract holders and pay their salaries alike. In addition, the Ministry claimed to have already submitted its 2017 budget proposal, including the funds earmarked for the management of CAJs, for approval along with the state budget in the national parliament. This is a clear message of sustainability in which the Ministry is preparing to assume future appropriation and ownership of CAJs and progressive withdrawal of UNDP's support in the management of CAJ activities.

4.3.2 The Exchange Rate Factor

The drop of operational costs in 2014 and 2015 was not only limited to the lack of significant purchases of equipment and furniture, construction and rehabilitation services or any of the above-mentioned factors. The fluctuation of the UN exchange rates also influenced the total figures to a certain degree. Before determining the influence of exchange rate in the total expenditures, it is essential to briefly explain what exchange rates entail in the field of Economics. According to the flexible exchange rate model in International Economics, an appreciation of a currency increases its value, whereas a depreciation of a currency decreases its value. An increase in the value of a currency makes it stronger in relation to the value of another currency. This gives the country with the stronger currency the purchasing power to buy more goods and services from the country with the weaker currency. Using the euro and dollar currencies as an example, Professor McEachern in


his textbook, *Economics*, defines the exchange rates as “The price, or exchange rate, of the euro in terms of dollar is the number of dollars required to purchase one euro. An increase in the number of dollars needed to purchase one euro indicates a weakening, or depreciation, of the dollar. A decrease in the number of dollars needed to purchase a euro indicates a strengthening, or an appreciation, of the dollar. Put another way, a decrease in the number of euros needed to purchase a dollar is a depreciation of the dollar, and an increase in the number of euros needed to purchase a dollar is an appreciation of the dollar (p.744).”

The same can also be said about the volatility of the UN exchange rates in regard to its purchases of goods, services and works. The exchange rates of the United Nations system are published on a monthly basis, and their fluctuation has a direct effect on goods and services it purchases globally. If the dollar appreciates in relation to Francs CFA, the UN wins in a sense that it takes the UN a few dollars and more francs CFA to pay for goods and services. If the dollar depreciates, however, the UN loses because it costs the UN more dollars to pay for goods and services. This may have implications on the budget. The chart below displays the average exchange rates of Francs CFA in relation to the US dollar for 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015 fiscal years. This scenario suggests how many francs CFA are required to purchase one US dollar.



After 2012, the average exchange rate figures remained relatively stable with minor changes between 2013 and 2014 but increased sharply in 2015. The decline in the number of francs CFA needed to purchase a dollar from 2012 to 2014 shows a depreciation of the dollar. This relationship is shown in a gradual decrease from 510.116 francs CFA in 2012 to 495.967 in 2013 and eventually to 492.917 francs CFA in 2014. This is a sign that francs CFA were stronger relative to the dollar. However, the increase in the number of francs CFA needed to purchase a dollar from 2014 to 2015 is an appreciation of the dollar. This relationship is shown in an increase from 492.917 francs CFA in 2014 to 594.849 francs CFA in 2015.

In order to provide a better interpretation of exchange rate figures in the above chart and subsequent understanding of their implications, we need to examine the percentage changes of exchange rates between 2012 and 2015. The following column chart shows that relationship.



The model of UN exchange rate in Guinea-Bissau is determined by the number of francs CFA needed to purchase a dollar. The dollar is the main focus of this exchange rate analysis as we are interested in determining its behavior in relation to its purchases of UN goods and services. The increase or decrease in the number of francs CFA needed to purchase a dollar is an appreciation or depreciation of the dollar. When the exchange rate of 510.116 francs CFA in 2012 decreased to 495.967 francs CFA in 2013, the dollar lost its value by -2.8% as reflected in red color in the above

graph. Likewise, the decrease from 495.967 francs CFA in 2013 to 492.917 francs CFA in 2014 caused the value of the dollar to drop again by -0.6% as indicated in purple in the graph. However, the dollar appreciated by 20.7% when rate of exchange increased from 492.917 francs CFA in 2014 to 594.849 francs CFA in 2015.

4.3.3 Effect of Depreciation in the Exchange Rate

What is the implication of the depreciation of the dollar relative to francs CFA for CAJ activities? How do the percentage changes in the exchange rates affect UNDP activities? What do the exchange rate figures and their percentage changes mean in real world? To answer these diagnostic and philosophical questions, we need to analyze two situations. First, we take a fresh look at a hypothetical situation in which we analyze the internet services rendered to CAJ by a local internet service provider ORANGE. Let us suppose that the monthly total revenues of ORANGE are in the amount of 345,000 francs CFA, and the annual total revenues are 4,140,000 francs CFA. Using the exchange rate model from the table below, the total revenue between 2012 and 2015 is 16,560,000 francs CFA, which corresponds to 31,821.86 USD.

Year	Exchange Rate	Total Revenues XOF	Total Revenues USD	Revenues Difference (2012-2015) USD	% Change in Exch. Rate 2012-2015
2012	510.116	4,140,000.00	8,115.80	-	
2013	495.967	4,140,000.00	8,347.33	231.53	-2.8
2014	492.917	4,140,000.00	8,398.98	51.65	-0.6
2015	594.849	4,140,000.00	6,959.75	-1,439.23	20.6
	Totals	16,560,000.00	31,821.86		

Though the total revenues in francs CFA are the same in four years (2012-2015), their amounts differ in US dollar due to changes in exchange rates. The reduction in the number of francs CFA in the exchange rate column from the table shows that the dollar is losing value from 2012 to 2014. Therefore, the dollar amount in total revenues column is increasing because strong francs CFA is buying more and more dollars, or more dollars are required to purchase francs CFA. Since francs

CFA is stronger relative to the dollar, it is costing the UN more dollars to pay for CAJ internet services as shown in the gradual increase of total revenues from 8,115.80 USD in 2012 to 8,347.33 USD in 2013, and from 8,347.33 USD in 2013 to 8,398.98 USD in 2014. However, the situation reversed from 2014 to 2015 when the dollar appreciated. This is shown in the drop of revenues from 8,398.98 USD in 2014 to 6,959.75 USD in 2015.

The volatility of percentage changes in exchange rates is cost sensitive to UN activities. For every decrease in percentage change, the dollar depreciates and the downside of a depreciation is that the UN finds that goods and services are more expensive. That is, the cost increases as it takes the UN more dollars to pay for goods and services. For example, the drop of the dollar value by -2.8% from 2012 to 2013 caused the UN to spend additional 231.53 USD on CAJ services. Likewise, the UN spent additional 51.65 USD for the depreciation of the dollar by -0.6% from 2013 to 2014. Therefore, the UN incurred additional cost in the total amount of 283.18 USD between 2012 and 2014 due to the depreciation of the dollar. For every increase in percentage change, however, the dollar appreciates, and the UN finds that goods and services are cheaper. That is, the cost to pay for goods and services decreases. The appreciation or increase of the dollar value by 20.7% from 2014 to 2015 indicates that the UN saved 1,439.23 USD on CAJ services. The minus sign of the amount is equivalent to subtracting it from the total amount of 8,398.98 USD in 2014, thereby reducing the overall cost to 6,959.75 USD in 2015. Our second analysis below provides another example to show the implication of how the dollar appreciated in 2015.

4.3.4 Effect of Appreciation in the Exchange Rate

Every time the number of francs CFA increases, the dollar appreciates. When the dollar is stronger relative to francs CFA, as it has been the case over the past year, UNDP's goods and services are cheaper. This means the cost decreases, and UNDP Rule of Law Programme spends a few dollars to pay for CAJ activities. This was particularly the case for expenditures of some activities of CAJs in 2015 when the cost reduced significantly. The examination of fixed costs of some categories of CAJs in the following table is the best example to illustrate this relationship.

Year	Entity	Salaries XOF	Salaries USD	Rent XOF	Rent USD
2014	CAJ Bairro Militar	13,920,000.00	28,281.63	3,600,000.00	7,314.21
2015	CAJ Bairro Militar	13,920,000.00	23,409.19	3,600,000.00	6,054.10
		Difference	-4,872.43		-1,260.11
2014	CAJ Bissau Velho	22,620,000.00	45,957.64	3,600,000.00	7,314.21
2015	CAJ Bissau Velho	22,620,000.00	38,039.94	3,600,000.00	6,054.10
		Difference	-7,917.70		-1,260.11


Some categories of CAJs such as salaries and rent have fixed costs in francs CFA, and one may assume that their cost would be determined by a corresponding amount in US dollars every year. However, this is not the case due to the volatility of exchange rate on a monthly and annual basis. For CAJ Bairro Militar in the above table, for example, the monthly salary amount in francs CFA is 1,160,000 francs CFA multiplied by 12 months equals to 13,920,000 francs CFA per year. Although this amount in local currency is the same for 2014 and 2015, it is totally different in US dollars for both years. The actual total amount spent on salaries in 2014 was 28,281.63 USD and 23,409.19 USD in 2015, with the difference of 4,872.43 USD. For CAJ Bissau Velho, the monthly salaries in francs CFA is 1,885,000 and 22,620,000 per year. The total was 45,957.64 USD in 2014 and 38,039.94 USD in 2015, with 7,917.70 USD of difference. The same line of reasoning can also be applied to the calculation of rent figures for both CAJs. The sum of all the differences amounts to -15,310.35 USD that the UN saved in 2015 for both categories: -12,790.13 USD of salaries and -2,520.22 USD of rent.

One thing that is perceptible in the previous table is that the amounts of the difference carry a minus sign. The basis for calculation is that the amount of the current year is subtracted from that of the previous year. That is, we are interested in finding the number that is deducted from that of the previous year (2014) to produce the amount or result of the current year (2015). If the amount of the current year is lower than that of the previous year, as is the case in both cases, that number would obviously be negative. The appreciation of the dollar in 2015 drives down the cost of salaries in US dollars, for example, of CAJ Bissau Velho from 45,957.64 USD in 2014 to 38,039.94 USD in 2015. Therefore, the rationale behind this reduction implies that some number

must be the product of subtraction between the two salaries (\$38,039.94 – \$45,957.64) of Bissau Velho. That number is -7,917.70 USD which carries a minus sign to show that it has been subtracted from 45,957.64 USD to give 38,039.94 USD. This is also the same amount that the UN was able to save on CAJ services as a result of the appreciation of the dollar in 2015.

5. Main Achievements (2012-2015)

The Access to Justice Centers have continued to promote alternative mechanisms of conflict resolution through mediation and conciliation approach as a significant contribution for the reconciliation of the society. According to the Annual Report 2015 of ROLS programme, five CAJs supported more than **7,000 cases** by the end of 2015. The overall percentage of case coverage was 26% for CAJ Canchungo, 22% for CAJ Bissau Velho, 19% for CAJ Mansoa and 16% each for CAJs Bairro Militar and Bafata.



Before the inauguration of the first four CAJs in the third quarter of 2011, 8 lawyers had been recruited and trained for the 4 access to justice centers, and 30 paralegals selected and trained under a grant agreement with Human Rights League to provide legal assistance in the CAJs and

in the communities. Immediately after the inauguration, CAJs assisted **699 cases** and provided legal awareness sessions on children rights, women's rights, illegal detentions, traditional justice and gender equality to over **3,000 citizens**. Most cases were on property and land disputes, labor law, family issues and on criminal cases maltreatment and domestic violence. Six illegal detainees were released from illegal detention, and five cases of corruption and poor administration of justice were restored with the illegal charges returned to the victims.

5.1 What are the reasons for discrepancies in the number of judicial cases assisted by CAJs and by year?

As expenditures for all CAJs increased in 2012 and 2013, but dwindled drastically in 2014 and 2015, the same was true with the supported cases in the same period. The first two years recorded the highest number of cases. The year 2012 spent 556,111.98 USD with the total coverage of 2,043 cases, while the year 2013 spent 512,257.23 USD and covered 1,888 cases. The year 2014 spent 389,433.18 USD with the total coverage of 1,779 cases, whereas 2015 spent 276,858.62 USD and covered 1,318 cases. Regional CAJs supported the majority of the cases in the total of 4,358 or 62%, while the urban CAJs assisted only 2,670 cases or 38%. What makes the difference in the number of assisted cases is the establishment of PAS only in the regions. PAS are locations where the population regularly meet with CAJ Legal Aid Technicians as well as Human Rights Activists to address problems facing their communities. In Cacheu Region, for example, there are PAS in Caio, Calequisse, Cacheu, Djolmete, Bula, Ingore, Bigene, Sao Domingos and Suzana. Therefore, the paralegals of CAJ Canchungo schedule their various meetings with local communities to assist their residents. Urban CAJs, on the other hand, liaise with Policia de Ordem Publica (POP-Public Order Police), Policia Judiciaria (PJ-Judiciary Police) and other police agencies in the capital city of Bissau to report cases. Furthermore, Bissau population are financially better off and can afford to hire a lawyer instead of going to CAJ for help. This might have been another reason in addition to the lack of PAS for lower number of cases in urban CAJs.

Even regional CAJs report discrepancies in the number of cases supported. CAJ Canchungo and CAJ Mansoa are exceptional example in this regard.

#	Description	CAJ CANCHUNGO	CAJ MANSOA	Difference
1	Total Expenditures (2012-2015)	\$453,877.85	\$418,519.37	\$35,358.48
2	Total Cases assisted (2012-2015)	1,850	1,349	501

As shown in the above table, the cases of CAJ Canchungo exceeded those of CAJ Mansoa with the total of 501 cases even though both entities spent roughly the same amount of money for four years. The wide gap in the number of cases is owed to the fact that CAJ Canchungo has more Postos de Atendimento Sectoriais than CAJ Mansoa. PAS are the determining factors in the participation and adherence of population to the activities of CAJ in the regions. The sensitization campaigns take place in PAS where Human Rights Activists and the population discuss a variety of thematic areas, including the modus operandi of CAJs. An increase in the number of PAS therefore is tantamount to a higher number of cases supported. CAJ Canchungo produced 1,850 cases from nine (9) aforementioned PAS in the Cacheu region, but CAJ Mansoa collected only 1,349 from four (4) PAS in Mansaba, Farim, Nhacra, and Bissora.

The production or registration of judicial cases by CAJs in the regions is not only driven by the existence of PAS, argues Mr. Braima N'dami, former Legal Aid Expert from CAJ Canchungo. Although Braima acknowledges the fact that PAS play a significant role, he argues that the flexibility of each CAJ to apply different strategies in light of the reality of the communities has far-reaching effects. For example, CAJ Canchungo took a proactive approach by working in partnership with local associations and NGOs to bring justice services closer to the people. This approach was successful as it helped CAJ Canchungo reach out to the population beyond the established PAS. In his own words, Braima explains: "I think CAJ Canchungo produced many cases because we were very proactive. We knew how to analyze the situation of CAJ [Canchungo] in different moments, proposing different thematic areas; holding lectures in schools and communities; and gathering different associations. In addition, we were able to bring services closer to the communities where PAS were not yet established." The regular trips by CAJ vehicles to PAS and non-PAS locations also explain why the cost of fuel was higher for CAJ Canchungo

as compared to other CAJs since the distances and routes to access these villages in rural setting were complicated indeed.

5.2 How were the supported cases handled by CAJs?

For more than 7,000 cases supported between 2012 and 2015, CAJs were able to resolve 5,007 or 70%, and the remaining are still undergoing legal judicial process to be resolved. While **“Resolved Cases”** involve prompt situations in which solutions may be reached instantly, **“Unresolved Cases”** are complexed in nature and require a broad and extensive reflection as they are often remitted to the courts for possible and eventual resolution. CAJs resolved most of the cases through mediation and conciliation strategies. Some of the problems raised by community residents in the PAS such as property or land disputes were immediately reported to local POP for solution thanks to the help of CAJ personnel. In addition, CAJ technical advisers also intervened to find solutions to the problems of population. In 2012, for example, CAJ Mansoa avoided forced marriage of a seventeen-year old girl in the Oio region. According to the newsletter of the Rule of Law and Security Programme, *ROLS Informs*, Luisa Sambu managed to avoid a forced marriage by uncles, with an older man, who had already been married and with children. On her own initiative, she went to the CAJ and asked for help from the legal assistants. "As I had no one else to help me and had heard of the Center [CAJ Mansoa], I went to ask for help because I do not want to marry," she explained, "because I had been told that the CAJ gave support to children and women victims of violence and that if I needed help, there were legal technicians who could help," she concluded. Luisa wanted to continue her studies, and had the right to decide when and whom to marry. The legal assistants from CAJ spoke with her family showing them the disadvantages and consequences of forced marriage of a minor. After this mediation, the uncles never again insisted on the marriage of their niece.

6. Part-to-Part Ratio⁹ Analysis

What is the ratio of the total operational cost to the total cases assisted by CAJs? The study attempts to answer this question by means of four approaches as follows:

⁹ A type of ratio that compares one part to another part of related quantities.

- 6.1 Total-Approach Ratio:** the total amount of 1,734,661.01 USD financed a total of 7,028 cases from 2012 to 2015. This yields a ratio of 247 USD for every one case or **247:1**;
- 6.2 Annual-Approach Ratio:** the year **2012** spent 556,111.98 USD for 2,043 cases (272:1); **2013** 512,257.23 USD for 1,888 (271:1); **2014** 389,433.18 USD for 1,779 (219:1); **2015** 276,858.62 USD for 1,318 (210:1). The total of these ratios equals to 973 USD; the four-year average of this value is 243 USD to one case or **243:1**;
- 6.3 Entity-Approach Ratio:** this approach is intended to derive ratios from individual CAJs during four years. CAJ Bafata spent 293,477.28 USD with 1,159 cases and the ratio of 253:1; CAJ Bairro Militar 235,509.09 USD for 1,141 (206:1); CAJ Bissau Velho 333,277.42 USD for 1,529 (218:1); CAJ Canchungo 453,877.85 USD for 1,850 (245:1); and CAJ Mansoa 418,519.37 USD for 1,349 (310:1). The total sum is 1,233 USD and divided by five CAJs equals to an average ratio of 247 USD to one case or **247:1**.
- 6.4 Geographic-Approach Ratio:** this approach is meant to derive ratios of five CAJs by geographical area: 3 regional CAJs and 2 urban CAJs. Regional CAJs spent 1,165,874.50 USD and assisted 4,358 cases. This generates a ratio of 268 USD to one case. Urban CAJs spent 568,786.51 USD and assisted 2,670 cases. This generates the ratio of 213 USD to one case. The sum of the two geographic values yields the average ratio of 240 USD to one case or **240:1**.

The average of the values of four approaches above is equal to **244 USD for every one case assisted or 244:1**. The tendency is for the cost to decrease in the future since CAJs are becoming more efficient in handling the cases at lower cost. For example, the trend of the total cost decreased gradually from 2012 to 2015, but CAJs were able to assist more than the annual target of fifteen hundred cases with the exception of 2015.

7. CAJ Future Prospect

The access to justice activities in Guinea-Bissau have received considerable international attention lately. Some donors are interested in financing the activities of CAJs. In 2015, for example, UNDP signed an agreement in the total amount of 247,860 USD with the United States Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) to support UNDP Rule of Law Programme in Guinea-Bissau. Approximately 61% or 150,000 USD of this amount is earmarked to create one CAJ in 2016 in the southern region of Buba. According to the findings of this study, the INL contribution is a reasonable amount as it falls slightly under the estimated cost of 162,330.29 USD to create one CAJ in the regions. On the other hand, the Rule of Law Programme has recently received a total amount of 687,850 USD from Peace Building Fund (PBF). Part of these funds will support the creation of one additional CAJ in the eastern region of Gabu in 2017.

In undertaking the efforts to ensure that justice is accessible to all, the Republic of Guinea-Bissau is gradually making progress with the expansion of access to justice facilities throughout the country. With the establishment of two additional CAJs in Buba and Gabu, the country will have a total of seven (7) CAJs by the end of 2017. Geographically, the political and administrative structure of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau consists of eight (8) regions and the autonomous sector of Bissau. Those regions are Cacheu, Oio, Bafata, Gabu, Quinara, Tombali, Biombo and Bolama Bijagos. In terms of national coverage, therefore, the country will cover five (5) regions¹⁰ or 62.5% by the end of 2017: Cacheu (CAJ Canchungo), Oio (CAJ Mansoa), Bafata (CAJ Bafata), Gabu (CAJ Gabu) and Quinara (CAJ Buba). The remaining three regions to establish the CAJs so as to complete the national territory are Tombali, Biombo and Bolama Bijagos.

8. Conclusion

A considerable attempt has been made in this report to show how the financial situation of CAJs evolved over a period of four years. The findings in this report show that it is definitely worth conducting this useful study especially to answer some key financing questions that are the

¹⁰ See the "Map of Guinea-Bissau by Region and Areas of CAJ Intervention" in Annex VIII

backbone of CAJ activities. The study is able not only to answer the question about how much it costs to finance one CAJ, but also show how this cost varies from one location to another. The study concludes that it costs a lot more to set up a CAJ in the rural areas than in the urban city. In addition, CAJs tend to be more expensive to establish in the first years than they are subsequently managed in the future years. We have also shown the linkage between the overall expenditures of CAJs and the total number of cases assisted during four years. Their quantitative ratio suggests that it costs CAJs less than two hundred and fifty dollars to assist one judicial case.

On the other hand, the current assisted cases are encouraging to show that CAJs are serving as alternatives to provide access to justice services given the fact that there are substantially few lawyers per capita in Guinea-Bissau. CAJs have been a major contribution for state building and social cohesion thanks to the financial and technical support of UNDP. CAJs have contributed to build trust in judicial institutions, making the delivery of legal aid services a reality for thousands of people by increasing the number of resolved cases through mediation and conciliation. It is therefore conducive to join efforts necessary for promoting continued support to the activities of CAJs. Since it is the intention of the Government of Guinea-Bissau to extend the legal aid services throughout the country, building from the experience of the five existing CAJs, it is likely that the Ministry of Justice will become increasingly reliant on the results of this study to facilitate the resource mobilization strategy and establishment of new CAJs in the foreseeable future.

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ANNEX I: CAJ RUNNING COSTS SUMMARY BY CATEGORY
2012-2015



CAJ RUNNING COSTS SUMMARY BY CATEGORY (2012-2015)

Values

Year	Entity	Salaries (USD)	Rent (USD)	Internet (USD)	Fuel (USD)	Maintenance (USD)	Office supplies (USD)	Const. & Rehabilitation (USD)	Equipment & Furniture (USD)	TOTAL (USD)	(%) of Total by CAJ & Year
2012	CAJ Bairro Militar	27,101.06	5,557.82	8,534.15	3,918.81	-	4,147.37	22,333.06	15,353.73	86,946.01	5%
	CAJ Bissau Velho	53,485.38	7,062.75	8,534.15	4,979.88	-	15,722.43	16,510.49	24,621.97	130,917.05	8%
	CAJ Canchungo	82,601.21	10,293.56	8,534.15	9,201.46	-	3,975.66	-	51,913.39	166,519.44	10%
	CAJ Mansoa	82,601.21	1,177.12	2,961.84	8,242.15	-	4,724.75	20,549.35	51,473.04	171,729.48	10%
2012 Total		245,788.86	24,091.25	28,564.30	26,342.32	-	28,570.22	59,392.91	143,362.13	556,111.98	32%
2013	CAJ Bafata	56,041.54	2,420.41	-	1,730.27	49.89	1,274.91	30,257.95	56,966.98	148,741.95	9%
	CAJ Bairro Militar	32,241.55	7,261.24	8,665.80	4,228.42	268.21	4,895.23	-	2,476.89	60,037.35	3%
	CAJ Bissau Velho	49,941.20	7,261.24	8,630.47	4,536.23	482.28	6,862.29	-	3,234.19	80,947.90	5%
	CAJ Canchungo	80,154.25	10,891.87	8,630.47	7,000.71	446.29	5,571.44	-	4,658.83	117,353.85	7%
	CAJ Mansoa	80,453.71	1,210.21	8,665.80	6,212.51	2,070.53	3,954.73	-	2,608.69	105,176.18	6%
2013 Total		298,832.25	29,044.98	34,592.54	23,708.14	3,317.20	22,558.59	30,257.95	69,945.58	512,257.23	30%
2014	CAJ Bafata	72,688.02	2,438.07	4,086.10	5,641.81	2,424.71	649.72	-	-	87,928.43	5%
	CAJ Bairro Militar	28,281.63	7,314.21	8,411.35	2,892.89	1,191.12	1,171.69	-	-	49,262.88	3%
	CAJ Bissau Velho	45,957.64	7,314.21	8,411.35	2,614.06	1,110.10	1,772.43	-	-	67,179.79	4%
	CAJ Canchungo	72,688.02	10,971.32	8,411.35	5,264.79	2,116.46	1,594.42	-	-	101,046.36	6%
	CAJ Mansoa	72,688.02	1,219.04	1,371.73	5,605.10	1,843.46	1,288.37	-	-	84,015.71	5%
2014 Total		292,303.33	29,256.85	30,691.87	22,018.65	8,685.85	6,476.62	-	-	389,433.18	22%
2015	CAJ Bafata	44,574.49	2,018.03	5,232.90	4,004.09	401.74	575.66	-	-	56,806.90	3%
	CAJ Bairro Militar	23,409.19	6,054.10	5,232.90	1,773.15	1,324.30	1,469.20	-	-	39,262.85	2%
	CAJ Bissau Velho	38,039.94	6,054.10	5,232.90	2,001.26	1,025.78	1,878.71	-	-	54,232.68	3%
	CAJ Canchungo	49,449.63	9,081.15	4,662.82	3,858.33	401.27	1,504.99	-	-	68,958.19	4%
	CAJ Mansoa	49,263.58	1,009.02	735.32	3,516.43	1,715.76	1,357.88	-	-	57,598.00	3%
2015 Total		204,736.84	24,216.41	21,096.83	15,153.27	4,868.85	6,786.43	-	-	276,858.62	16%
Grand Total		1,041,661.28	106,609.49	114,945.54	87,222.38	16,871.90	64,391.86	89,650.85	213,307.71	1,734,661.01	100%

Prepared by:

Taino Monteiro



ANNEX II: SUMMARY OF TOTAL EXPENDITURES BY CAJ AND YEAR

SUMMARY OF TOTAL EXPENDITURES BY CAJ AND YEAR

Year	Entity	TOTAL USD	Total %
2012	CAJ Bairro Militar	86,946.01	5%
	CAJ Bissau Velho	130,917.05	8%
	CAJ Canchungo	166,519.44	10%
	CAJ Mansoa	171,729.48	10%
2012 Total		556,111.98	32%
2013	CAJ Bafata	148,741.95	9%
	CAJ Bairro Militar	60,037.35	3%
	CAJ Bissau Velho	80,947.90	5%
	CAJ Canchungo	117,353.85	7%
	CAJ Mansoa	105,176.18	6%
2013 Total		512,257.23	30%
2014	CAJ Bafata	87,928.43	5%
	CAJ Bairro Militar	49,262.88	3%
	CAJ Bissau Velho	67,179.79	4%
	CAJ Canchungo	101,046.36	6%
	CAJ Mansoa	84,015.71	5%
2014 Total		389,433.18	22%
2015	CAJ Bafata	56,806.90	3%
	CAJ Bairro Militar	39,262.85	2%
	CAJ Bissau Velho	54,232.68	3%
	CAJ Canchungo	68,958.19	4%
	CAJ Mansoa	57,598.00	3%
2015 Total		276,858.62	16%
Grand Total		1,734,661.01	100%

Prepared by :
Taino Monteiro

ANNEX III : STUDY QUESTIONS



STUDY QUESTIONS

#	Description	Target Group	Type of Data	Collection Technique	Sources Explored
1	“How much does it cost to create one CAJ from scratch and sustain its expenses for one year?”	UNDP Staff ; CAJ Staff ; Partners, LGDH Activists	Quantitative	CAJ Monthly reports; ATLAS reports.	Project reports, CAJ reports, ROLS monitoring reports, and Secondary data.
2	Why did some CAJs Spend More than Others?	UNDP Staff ; CAJ Staff ; Partners, LGDH Activists	Quantitative	CAJ Monthly reports; ATLAS reports.	
3	What are the annual expenditures of CAJ activities? Why are total expenditures high in some years but low in others?	UNDP Staff ; CAJ Staff ; LGDH Activists, Partners	Quantitative	UNDP Staff ; CAJ Staff ; Partners	
4	Why Did the Total Expenditures Fall Drastically in 2014 and 2015?	UNDP Staff ; CAJ Staff ; Partners, LGDH Activists	Quantitative	UNDP Staff ; CAJ Staff ; Partners	
5	What are the reasons for discrepancies in the number of judicial cases assisted by CAJs and by year?	UNDP Staff ; CAJ Staff ; Partners	Quantitative	UNDP Staff ; CAJ Staff ; Partners	
6	How were the supported cases handled by CAJs?	UNDP Staff ; CAJ Staff ; Partners	Qualitative	Interviews: UNDP Staff ; CAJ Staff ; Partners	
7	What is the ratio of the total operational cost to the total cases assisted?	UNDP Staff ; CAJ Staff ; Partners	Quantitative	UNDP Staff ; CAJ Staff ; Partners	



**ANNEX IV: TABLE OF UN RATES OF EXCHANGE
(2012-2015)**



UN Rates of Exchange (2012-2015)

Values

Month	2012 (XOF/1USD)	2013 (XOF/1USD)	2014 (XOF/1USD)	2015 (XOF/1USD)	2012 Average Exch Rate	2013 Average Exch Rate	2014 Average Exch Rate	2015 Average Exch Rate	% Change in Exch Rate (2012-2013)	% Change in Exch Rate (2013-2014)	% Change in Exch Rate (2014- 2015)
January	507.711	494.592	475.262	577.787	42.309	41.216	39.605	48.149	-2.58395032	-3.908271869	21.572
February	500.495	483.44	483.245	598.819	41.708	40.287	40.270	49.902	-3.40762645	-0.040335926	23.916
March	489.344	507.055	479.431	584.314	40.779	42.255	39.953	48.693	3.619335273	-5.447929712	21.877
April	493.936	513.614	476.817	605.182	41.161	42.801	39.735	50.432	3.983916945	-7.164329633	26.921
May	495.248	501.151	474.54	593.036	41.271	41.763	39.545	49.420	1.191928085	-5.309976434	24.971
June	528.045	503.119	482.357	602.182	44.004	41.927	40.196	50.182	-4.72043102	-4.126657908	24.842
July	527.389	503.116	482.712	590.095	43.949	41.926	40.226	49.175	-4.60248507	-4.055525962	22.246
August	535.261	494.592	490.398	600.363	44.605	41.216	40.867	50.030	-7.59797557	-0.847971661	22.424
September	522.798	495.248	498.107	583.28	43.567	41.271	41.509	48.607	-5.26972177	0.577286531	17.099
October	509.679	483.44	516.258	584.632	42.473	40.287	43.022	48.719	-5.14814226	6.788432898	13.244
November	506.399	489.344	526.662	598.446	42.200	40.779	43.889	49.871	-3.36789765	7.626128041	13.630
December	505.087	482.889	529.211	620.056	42.091	40.241	44.101	51.671	-4.39488643	9.59268072	17.166
Grand Total	6121.392	5951.6	5915	7138.192	510.116	495.967	492.917	594.849	-2.77	-0.6	20.7



ANNEX V : CALCULATION OF RATIOS

RATIOS

Total-Approach Ratio		
	Description	Totals
1	CAJ Total Expenditures (2012-2015)	\$ 1,734,661.01
2	CAJ Total Cases (2012-2015)	7,028
3	Ratio	\$ 247

Annual-Approach Ratio					
	YEARS				
Description	2012	2013	2014	2015	total
Total Amount Spent	\$ 556,111.98	\$ 512,257.23	\$ 389,433.18	\$ 276,858.62	
Total Cases Supported	2,043	1,888	1,779	1,318	
Annual Ratio Analysis	\$ 272	\$ 271	\$ 219	\$ 210	\$ 973
				# of Years	4
				Average	\$ 243

Entity-Approach Ratio							
#	Description	CAJ Bafata	CAJ Bairro Militar	CAJ Bissau Velho	CAJ Canchungo	CAJ Mansoa	
1	Total Expenditures	\$ 293,477.28	\$ 235,509.09	\$333,277.42	\$453,877.85	\$ 418,519.37	
2	Total Cases	1,159.00	1,141.00	1,529.00	1,850.00	1,349.00	
3	Ratio	\$ 253	\$ 206	\$ 218	\$ 245	\$ 310	\$ 1,233
						# of CAJs	5
						Average	\$ 247

Geographic-Approach Ratio				
	Description	Total Expenditures	Total Cases	Ratio
1	Regional CAJs	\$ 1,165,874.50	4358	\$ 268
2	Urban CAJs	\$ 568,786.51	2670	\$ 213
3	Average			\$ 241

The final average ratio of 4 approaches = **244 USD for every one case assisted or 244:1**

ANNEX VI:
SAMPLE OF FORMS USED FOR DATA COLLECTION OF OPERATIONAL COSTS
(2012-2015)



Monthly Data Collection Form

[illegible]

13	PAPER A4 in units (Resmas)													
14	Maintenance of Motorbikes & Generator													
15	Transportation fees for Cleaner													
16	Cleaning products: soap, detergent, brooms, mops, bleach, etc.													
17	Remaining cost: clips, staplers, staples, post-it, pens, pencils, notebooks, etc.													
18	Subtotal 3 (Additional expenses)													
19	TOTAL in Francs CFA													
	TOTAL in USD \$													

Civil Society Organization LGDH - Human Rights League Access to Justice activities CAJ BISSAU VELHO

20	Salary of Coordinator													
21	Salary of 1 Comentator													
22	Salary of 1 Apresentador													
23	Salary of 5 LGDH Advisers													
24	Rental of electronic equipment													
25	Gasoline Consumption: MOTORBIKES													
26	Diesel Consumption: Vehicle													
27	Transportation cost for Djumbais participants													
28	Radio programs													
29	Purchase of Foodstuff for Djumbais													

30	Purchase of Computer													
31	Vehicle rental for Djumbais													
32	Paper A4 Consumption in Units (resma)													
33	Fund of support to Victims													
34	Maintenance of Motorbikes, purchase of cellphone cards, etc.													
35	General cost of Office Supplies: notebooks, clips, post-it notes, pens, pencils, staplers, separators, pins, Communication, etc													
36	Subtotal 4 (CSO LGDH cost)													

GRAND TOTAL in Franes CFA														
UN Rate of Exchange XOF/1 USDS														
Grand Total in USD (\$)														

Prepared by: Taino Monteiro

DATE:

8-Feb-13

Operational Costs 2013

Month	Salaries XOF	Monthly Exch. Rate (XOF/\$1)	Salaries USD	Rent XOF	Rent USD	Internet XOF	Internet USD	Fuel XOF	Fuel USD	Maintenance XOF	Maintenance USD	Office supplies XOF	Office supplies USD	Const. & Rehabi- litation USD	Equipment & Furniture XOF	Equipment & Furniture USD	TOTAL \$
January	2,447,500	494.592	4,948.52	300,000	606.56	362,500	732.93	374,660	757.51	30,520	61.71	819,584	1,657.09	-	600,000	1,213.13	9,977.45
February	1,885,000	483.440	3,899.14	300,000	620.55	362,500	749.83	100,580	208.05	37,000	76.53	73,000	151.00	-	-	-	5,705.11
March	2,422,500	507.055	4,777.59	300,000	591.65	362,500	714.91	149,100	294.05	79,727	157.24	356,797	703.67	-	600,000	1,183.31	8,422.41
April	2,422,500	513.614	4,716.58	300,000	584.10	362,500	705.78	363,200	707.15	44,700	87.03	808,850	1,574.82	-	200,000	389.40	8,764.85
May	2,422,500	501.151	4,833.87	300,000	598.62	362,500	723.33	326,000	650.50	50,000	99.77	1,011,035	2,017.43	-	200,000	399.09	9,322.62
June	1,885,000	503.119	3,746.63	300,000	596.28	362,500	720.51	80,000	159.01	-	-	105,345	209.38	-	24,783	49.26	5,481.07
July	1,885,000	503.116	3,746.65	300,000	596.28	362,500	720.51	169,365	336.63	-	-	79,300	157.62	-	-	-	5,557.69
August	1,885,000	494.592	3,811.22	300,000	606.56	362,500	732.93	70,000	141.53	-	-	77,850	157.40	-	-	-	5,449.64
September	1,885,000	495.248	3,806.17	300,000	605.76	345,000	696.62	143,800	290.36	-	-	25,000	50.48	-	-	-	5,449.39
October	1,885,000	483.440	3,899.14	300,000	620.55	345,000	713.64	143,800	297.45	-	-	27,000	55.85	-	-	-	5,586.63
November	1,885,000	489.344	3,852.10	300,000	613.07	345,000	705.03	194,080	396.61	-	-	37,790	77.23	-	-	-	5,644.03
December	1,885,000	482.889	3,903.59	300,000	621.26	345,000	714.45	143,600	297.38	-	-	24,300	50.32	-	-	-	5,587.00
	24,795,000		49,941.20	3,600,000	7,261.24	4,280,000	8,630.47	2,258,185	4,536.23	241,947	482.28	3,445,851	6,862.29	-	1,624,783	3,234.19	80,947.90

Prepared by :

Taino Monteiro

**ANNEX VII: CHRONOLOGY OF THE PROCESS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ACCESS TO JUSTICE
CENTERS**

Chronology of the Process for the Establishment of the Access to Justice Centers

November 2009 – Launching of the process of drafting the National Justice Policy and its Strategic Plan by the Ministry of Justice, with UNDP support.

August 2010 – Beginning of the conceptualization of the Legal Framework for the Access to justice mechanisms by the Ministry of Justice with UNDP support.

October 2010 – National Justice Forum for the validation of the National Forum and the Strategic Plan.



The discussion of the forum of the justice sector

November 2010 – Launching of the Access to Justice Assessment in Guinea Bissau: Regions of Oio, Cacheu and Bissau, with the aim of collecting evidence-based information on Access to justice constraints both from the claim holders and duty bearers. This study served as the reference for the Access to justice mechanisms to be implemented in these three pilot regions.

January 2011 – Adoption of the National Justice Policy and Strategic Plan 2010-2015 by the Council of Ministers. The policy and plan set the establishment of the access to justice centers as first level priority for the government of Guinea Bissau, with a deadline for its implementation of 2 years.

February 2011 – Adoption of decree law 11/2011 of 3 February that frames the creation and establishment of the Office for Legal Information and Consultation and the Access to Justice Centers and regulates the conditions for provision of a public service of legal information and counseling for free, for the population, in particular the most vulnerable.

April 2011 – Signature of the Letter of Agreement between UNDP and the Ministry of Justice for the implementation of GICJU and CAJ in three regions of the country – Bissau, Oio and Cacheu.



Mr. Gana Fofang, UNDP Resident Representative (left) and Mr. Mamadu Saliu Jalo Pires, Minister of Justice (right) during the signature of the Letter of Agreement.

On the same day, the signature of the Agreement between the Ministry of Justice and the Bar Association took place to regulate the provision of a pro bono defender (lawyer) under the Cabinet of Information and Legal Counseling (GICJU) competencies and responsibilities (Ministry of Justice financing the Bar Association to cover the cost of the *pro bono* services, provided by Bar Association members, upon CAJ request. The funds were a UNDP donation to the Ministry of Justice).

May 2011 – Seminar for the presentation of the results of the Access to Justice Assessment and first public presentation of the Access to justice mechanisms in the process of creation by the government.



May 2011 – Launching of the Training Course and selection of the 8 Legal Technical Assistants (2 in each CAJ) to work in the Access to justice centers.

June 2011 – Launching of the rehabilitation Works of four offices for CAJs by UNDP.

July 2011 – Signature of the Grant Agreement with the Human Rights League (HRL) for the implementation of a Project

Effective Promotion of Access to Justice, to be implemented for one year in Bissau, Oio and Cacheu whereby 30 HRL activists, duly trained for the purpose, will be based in the Access to justice centers to support the work of the centers on a more community based perspective.

July 2011 – Ceremony to award certificates to 8 Legal Aid Technicians who attended successfully the training course. They were recruited by the Ministry of Justice to provide legal aid in the Access to Justice Centers.

August 2011 – Training course on Legal Assistance delivered to 30 Guinean League for Human Rights (LGDH) activists.

September 2011 – Establishment of 4 Access to Justice Centers finalized through rehabilitation and full provision of equipment. The rehabilitation and equipment were funded by ROLS/UNDP.

September 13th and 14th 2011 – Inauguration day (opening day) for four Access to Justice Centers (CAJs): 2 in Bissau (Bissau Velho and Bairro Militar), one in Canchungo and one in Mansoa.




Ms. Lalao Raharisoa, Deputy Resident Representative/Program and Mr. Mamadu Saliu Jalo Pires, Minister of Justice, during the inauguration of CAJ Canchungo.



ANNEX VIII: MAP OF GUINEA-BISSAU BY REGION AND AREAS OF CAJ INTERVENTION



Map of Guinea-Bissau by Region and Areas of CAJ Intervention



Map Source : INE